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Abstract
The steady application of Quantitative Easing (QE) has been followed by big
and non-monotonic effects on international asset prices and international capital
flows. These are difficult to explain in conventional models, but arise naturally
in a model with collateral. This paper develops a general-equilibrium framework
to explore QE’s international transmission involving an advanced economy (AE)
and an emerging market economy (EM) whose assets have less collateral capacity.
Capital flows arise as a result of international sharing of scarce collateral. The
crucial insight is that private AE agents adjust their portfolios in different ways in
response to QE, conditional on whether they are (i) fully leveraged, (ii) partially
leveraged or (iii) unleveraged. These portfolio shifts of international assets can
diminish or even reverse the effectiveness of ever-larger QE interventions on asset
prices. The model provides a simultaneous interpretation of several important
stylized facts associated with QE.
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1 Introduction
The so-called Quantitative Easing (QE) undertaken in the United States and Europe
in the aftermath of the Great Recession has been the largest central bank intervention
in history. Over the course of a few years, the Fed and the ECB purchased trillions
of dollars of assets in an effort to raise their prices (lower their yields) and thereby to
stimulate lagging economies. Prices did rise at first, but eventually they fell again even
as QE continued to expand, creating a non-monotonic effect that is difficult to explain
with conventional models.1
While QE was primarily intended to influence domestic economies, policy makers in
emerging markets (EMs) have argued that QE policies in advanced economies (AEs)
generated unprecedented cross-country effects on asset prices and cross-border financial
flows. While a vast and lively empirical literature has identified and documented the
financial spillover effects of QE2, the economic explanations behind the asset price effects
and the international transmission of QE remain relatively obscure (due to a lack of
theoretical work).
This paper explains the non-monotonic price effects of QE on domestic prices and
the effects of QE on international flows and prices in a two-country general equilibrium
model with collateral. We show that all these effects emerge from the hypothesis that the
assets purchased by QE in advanced economies function as good collateral, while similar
assets in emerging countries cannot be easily used as collateral.
Collateral plays a key role in the model since all private borrowing must be secured
by collateral, and only assets in AE can serve as collateral to secure financial claims. We
introduce a central bank in AE that can implement QE in the form of open-market asset
purchases (financed by issuing riskless debt). The model shows that the steady application
of QE can generate non-monotonic effects on AE asset prices and international spreads;
furthermore, it induces private portfolio shifts of international assets that can, in turn,
feed back to affect the impact of QE on asset prices.
This paper focuses on a collateral channel of transmission. We feel that the collateral
channel is essential for four reasons: (i) global demand for collateral and collateralized
funding has risen sharply in the aftermath of the financial crisis for myriad reasons (e.g.,
increased risk aversion and regulatory changes)3 and (ii) QE has involved massive pur-
chases of high-quality collateral (that traditionally play an important role in facilitat-
ing collateralized cross-border funding) and (iii) collateral constraints can generate non-
monotonic price effects from QE and (iv) AE countries have more collateral than EM
1Of course other factors, not connected with QE, may have caused the price reversal. But we seek to explain why QE
itself might have been expected to generate non-monotonic effects in the scale of QE, even without changes in real growth
or inflation.
2See, for example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Fratzscher et al. (2013), Chol and Rhee (2013), and
Chen et al. (2015) (among many others).
3See, for example, Adrian and Shin (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2012), Singh (2013), and Bank of International
Settlement CGFS Paper No.49 (2013) for further discussions on the evolving role of collateral after the recent financial
crisis.
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countries, and so QE can affect collateralized cross-border funding. The assets purchased
by QE (e.g., government bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS)) are the most
utilized for “collateral”, measured by the amounts of collateralized borrowing obtained
by pledging them (as collateral) in various collateral markets. For example, domestic
and international holders of U.S. Treasury securities have easy access to collateralized
funding by pledging the underlying securities as collateral in the repo, securities-lending,
prime-brokerage, and derivatives markets. (According to Baklanova et al. (2016), U.S.
Treasury securities make up the dominant share of collateral utilized in the multitrillion,
bilateral, U.S. repo market and they also find that rates and haircuts vary significantly
across asset classes. ) 4
By incorporating collateral and agent-heterogeneity, the model offers a simultaneous
interpretation of the following four stylized facts observed during QE episodes in the
United States since the fall of 2010 that are difficult to rationalize in conventional open
macroeconomic models.
Fact 1(a): changes in long-term Treasury yields and the term premium. The Federal
Reserve’s large-scale purchase of long-term U.S. Treasury securities was accompanied by
a decline in the 10-year Treasury yield5 from 2.67% on November 3, 2010 (announcement
date of QE2), to a low of 1.44% on July 24th, 2012. During this period, the Fed’s holdings
of long-term U.S. Treasury securities6 rose from $146 billion to $346 billion.
Fact 1(b): The Federal Reserve continued to increase its holdings of long-term U.S.
Treasury securities (which attained a high of $664 billion on November 12, 2014); however,
the 10-year yield rose from 1.44% to 2.37% during this period.
As a side note to Fact 1 (a) and (b), estimates of the 10-year Treasury term premium7
show similar patterns to the 10-year Treasury yield over the same period in consideration
(Figure 1).
Table 1: Fact 1(a) and (b)
11/3/2010 07/24/2012 11/12/2014
Fed’s Holdings of Long-term Treasuries (bn) 146 346 664
10-Year Treasury Yield (%) 2.67 1.44 2.37
4Their data were collected from the U.S.-affiliated securities dealers of nine bank holding companies, under a voluntary
pilot program run by the Office of Financial Research and the Federal Reserve System (with input from the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
5Constant maturity yield from FRED.
6Data include U.S. Treasury securities with maturity over 10 years. Source: FRED.
710-year Treasury term premium estimates by the ACM model, available on Federal Reserve Bank of New York website.
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Figure 1: 10-Year Treasury Yield (L), ACM 10-Year Term Premium Estimates (L) and Fed’s
Holdings of Long-Term Treasuries (R)
Fact 2: changes in financial spillover effects. Long-term yield spreads8 between EMs
and the United States widened between November 2010 and July 2012; however, they
subsequently shrank between July 2012 and November 2014.
Figure 2: Yield Spread Between Emerging Markets and the U.S.
Fact 3: heterogeneous portfolio adjustments in the United States. During QE episodes,
U.S. financial and non-financial organizations have responded differently in the context of
international portfolio adjustments. For example, U.S. financial organizations increased
their holdings of long-term foreign government bonds from $314 billion to $543 billion
between September 2011 and November 2014. By contrast, non-financial organizations
8Spread between Barclays Emerging Market Local Currency Government Bond Index yield and U.S. Aggregate Bond
Index yield.
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reduced their holdings of long-term foreign government bonds from $179 billion to $112
billion over the same period.9
Table 2: Fact 3: U.S. Holdings of Long-Term Foreign Government Bonds
Sept 2011 Nov 2014
U.S. Financial Organizations (bn) 314 543
U.S. Non-financial Organizations (bn) 179 112
Fact 4: Persistent global demand for U.S. Treasury securities. Overseas holdings
of U.S. Treasuries have remained consistent in response to the Fed’s asset purchases. In
particular, foreign private demand for U.S. Treasury securities has been especially strong,
even as Treasury yields fell.
Figure 3: Persistent Global Demand for U.S. Treasury Securities10
Figure 4: Foreign Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities11
9Data source: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Starting date of dataset is September 2011.
10Source: Deutsche Bank.
5
The aforementioned facts are difficult to rationalize in conventional open macroeco-
nomic frameworks (e.g., when the short-term interest rate is taken as the only dimension
of monetary policy and monetary spillovers stem from simple interest-rate differentials).
In conventional macroeconomic models, it is often assumed that the central bank can
arbitrarily set the short-term nominal interest rate via an open-market operations; how-
ever, Fact 1 (a) and (b) suggest that the central bank has less control over other market
rates of return. Figure 1 illustrates that the Federal Reserve’s open-market purchases of
long-term Treasury securities were accompanied by non-monotonic changes in long-term
Treasury yield and its term premium. Thus, one needs to model a central bank’s open-
market purchases more explicitly in order to make sense of the possible effects of QE on
asset prices.
The interest-rate differential in conventional open-economy models does not suffi-
ciently clarify the kind of monetary spillovers observed in Fact 2 either, given that the
U.S. policy rate has remained persistently near its effective lower bound. Thus, one needs
to consider more explicitly how the central bank’s open-market asset purchases may give
rise to additional monetary spillovers (beyond those captured in conventional models).
Fact 3 suggests that conventional models (with representative households) are unable
to explain the heterogeneous asset-holding patterns within the United States during QE
episodes. Lastly, Fact 4 suggests the need to capture certain distinct properties of U.S.
Treasury securities in order to provide an economic foundation for the persistent global
demand in response to QE. Thus, this paper develops a framework that rationalizes these
patterns in the stylized facts as being collectively driven by QE. Of course, a myriad of
other factors could have separately contributed to each of the above facts over this time-
frame; however, we ignore them. In particular, our model suppresses credit easing (CE)
policies. Instead, the model offers a way to jointly interpret the qualitative patterns in
these facts with QE as the common driving force. 12
As previously noted, collateral and agent-heterogeneity play key roles in the model.
All private borrowing must be collateralized and only AE assets can be utilized inter-
nationally to secure privately issued financial claims. Capital flows arise as a result of
international sharing of scarce collateral: collateral-constrained agents, in both economies,
purchase AE assets with collateralized borrowing - bidding up the collateral value and
price of AE assets while making the cheaper EM assets an attractive alternative to agents
that do not demand collateral. Central banks (unlike private agents) can borrow to make
asset purchases without collateral constraints; this type of superior financing ability does
enable the AE central bank to have real effects on the global economy.
Importantly, the AE central bank’s balance sheet is modeled as being indirectly owned
by AE agents; thus, risks taken onto the AE central bank’s balance sheet (via QE) will
be distributed among AE agents (via the associated fiscal consequences). As a result,
11Source: Treasury International Survey (TIC).
12See Bernanke (2009) for a discussion on the distinction between CE and QE.
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QE creates a hedging demand among AE agents to adjust their portfolios optimally. AE
agents will respond to QE even if prices don’t change, while EM households will respond
only to price changes. The model simulation shows that the early phase of QE increases
the price of AE assets and widens the spread between AE and EM asset prices. However,
continued QE induces portfolio shifts (of AE agents) towards EM assets; this causes (i) a
decline in AE asset prices and (ii) a tightening of the spread between AE and EM asset
prices. Lastly, in the final phase of QE (i.e., extremely aggressive QE), AE asset prices
and the international spread rise again.
The crucial insight is that before prices have moved, private AE agents adjust their
international portfolios in response to QE in different ways, conditional on whether they
are (i) fully leveraged, (ii) partially leveraged or (iii) unleveraged. The model characterizes
three different types of QE-generated, private portfolio adjustments (of AE agents) that
explain the aforementioned simulation patterns. First, fully leveraged agents partially
offset QE via sales of some of their own AE assets (effectively selling them to the AE
central bank). Second, partially leveraged agents respond to QE by concurrently (i) selling
more AE assets than the AE central bank buys and (ii) buying some EM assets (with
higher rates of return). Third, unleveraged agents respond to QE by concurrently selling
existing holdings of EM assets and absorbing increases in riskless, central bank reserves.
Such portfolio shifts of international assets can diminish or even reverse the effectiveness
of ever-larger QE interventions on asset prices. As QE expands, fully leveraged agents
become partially leveraged, and thus begin to reverse the effects of QE. EM agents have
no incentive to change their portfolios in response to QE before prices have moved, because
they are not directly affected by the AE central bank balance sheet. Even after prices
adjust to QE, and despite radical cross-border portfolio adjustments, EM demand for AE
assets remains relatively stable in response to QE because of persistent EM demand for
collateral.
QE tends to raise the welfare of AE at the expense of EM, because the superiority
of AE collateral means that EM will be a net buyer of AE collateral. By purchasing
the same collateral, the AE central bank tends to raise its price, and thus benefit the
AE sellers of the collateral at the expense of the EM buyers of AE collateral. Our model
includes heterogeneous agents, so to get a Pareto improvement for all agents in AE, at the
expense of EM, requires a calibrated intervention. AE agents who want to leverage will
also be buyers of AE collateral, and thus hurt by the QE induced price rise of collateral.
But they are also helped by QE, because the AE central bank is effectively purchasing
the collateral on their behalf at 100% LTV levels, which they would like to do but which
the market will not allow them to do because they cannot commit to repay. Thus we
show that there is an interval of QE levels over which all AE agents benefit from QE, at
the expense of EM agents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 develops a two-country monetary model with endogenous collateral constraints.
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The model characterizes three different types of private portfolio adjustment in response
to QE. Section 4 illustrates the international transmission of QE via a simple numeri-
cal example and shows that under certain conditions, the aforementioned stylized facts
emerge naturally in the collateral equilibrium of the model. Section 5 discusses the welfare
implications of QE. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to a few different strands of literature. First, the general model
setup builds upon the collateral equilibrium frameworks developed in Geanakoplos (1997),
Geanakoplos and Zame (2014), and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008, 2015 a,b), which em-
phasize the role of collateral and collateralization (e.g., leveraging and tranching) in
driving asset prices and real investments. Second, the financial integration modeling
is related to literature that studies global imbalances and emphasizes the role of het-
erogeneous financial developments (across countries). Specifically, (i) Caballero et al.
(2008) show how the unique ability of the United States to produce and supply tradable
financial assets (from real assets) can give rise to a persistent trade deficit, global im-
balances, and low global interest rates; (ii) Mendoza et al. (2009) develop a model with
idiosyncratic risks and limited contract enforceability and show that the United States
can rationalize its asymmetric external balance sheet and relatively low interest rates
due to a superior ability to enforce contracts; (iii) Maggiori (2013) provides a risk-based
view of cross-country differences in financial development (and the associated model ra-
tionalizes global imbalances as a consequence of the asymmetric risk-absorbing capacities
across countries); and (iv) Fostel, Geanakoplos, and Phelan (2017)—the most relevant
work in this context—show, in a two-country model, that cross-border capital flow can
arise between countries with different capacities to leverage or tranche assets. In their
model, capital flows can arise as a way of sharing scarce collateral, even in the absence of
interest rate differentials or risk-sharing motives. The financially sophisticated country
has a superior ability to create contingent payoff streams from underlying collateral and
induce cross-border asset holdings driven by demand for specialized cash flows. However,
their model does not consider the effects of policy interventions on such capital flows.
Third, the modeling herein of the transmission mechanism of quantitative easing (QE)
is related to literature that considers the central bank’s asset purchases explicitly and how
they may affect the private sector’s financial conditions. Some recent work (e.g., Curdia
and Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013)) develops models that capture
how a central bank’s direct lending to specific types of borrowers (at below-market rates)
can help mitigate the malfunctioning of private financial intermediation (e.g., as we saw
during the depths of the Great Recession). These models are appropriate for the study
of central bank credit-easing (CE) policies during times of financial turmoil. Our focus
differs from the aforementioned literature and is instead concentrated on central bank
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QE policy that involves purchases of highly liquid assets as a way of influencing economic
activity, even when all agents can trade all assets at the same prices.
In this regard, this paper is most closely related to Araujo, Schommer, and Woodford
(2015); they consider central bank asset purchases when all market participants have
equal access to the same set of traded assets at well-defined market prices (independent
of the identity of the purchaser) and thus when the markets are efficient. However, the
markets in their model are not completely frictionless since all privately issued finan-
cial claims must be secured by collateral. They note that this “collateral requirement”
captures the kind of financial friction that exists—even in markets that are generally
considered efficient 13 and is thus important for “unconventional” monetary policies that
interacts with private intermediation. In a completely frictionless economy with rational
expectations, the central bank’s asset purchases do not have any real effects (since it is
simply a financial intermediary; whatever it does, agents will undo the effects in their own
portfolios). Thus, certain types of financial frictions must exist in order for the central
bank’s intervention to generate meaningful impacts. 14 They model the central bank’s
balance sheet as indirectly owned by domestic households, based on the assumption that
any earnings or losses from the central bank’s asset holdings will eventually be transferred
to domestic households. They show that the central bank’s purchases of collateral-like
assets (e.g., government bonds and mortgage-backed securities) can generate real effects
by affecting collateral constraints in the economy. However, their model does not consider
how such central bank interventions may generate financial spillovers in open-economy
contexts, or how it can create non-monotonic effects on spreads. The literature on the
transmission of QE also includes other important studies (e.g., Vayanos and Vila (2009);
Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2011); and Williamson (2012))—all of which provide key
insights into possible mechanisms of QE’s transmission.
Fourth, this paper is related to the literature that emphasizes the special role played
by (i) U.S. assets in the international financial system and (ii) the U.S. dollar. Certain
studies (e.g., Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen (2012), Matteo (2013), and Negal (2016)) pro-
vide empirical evidence on the safety and liquidity premium of the U.S. dollar and U.S.
assets. On the theory side, both early and recent work (e.g., Despres, Kindleberger, and
Salant (1966); Gourinchas and Rey (2007); and Farhi and Maggiori (2016)), provides in-
sights into understanding the international financial architecture (with the United States
characterized as the key country). This paper instead focuses on the superior collateral
value of U.S. assets (e.g., U.S. Treasuries) relative to their emerging-marketing (EM)
counterparts.
Last, but not least, this paper is also related to the literature on the portfolio balance
13As noted in Geanakoplos (1997), much of the lending in modern times is secured by some form of collateral (in contrast
to a complete market setup with private agents borrowing arbitrarily with no concern over default).
14For instance, “Wallace Neutrality” suggests that a central bank’s open market operation is neutral in the absence of any
financial friction (i.e., when a market is complete). Backus and Kehoe (1989) suggest that under certain economic conditions,
government portfolios are irrelevant (similar to the irrelevance of corporate liability structures under the Modigliani-Miller
theorem).
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channel of exchange rate determination.15 This literature considers the exchange rate
as the relative price of currencies that equilibrates the demand and supply of various
international financial assets. While this paper assumes trivial fixed exchange rate, it
does explicitly consider the demand and supply of different international assets (that
resembles the portfolio balance channel mentioned above).
3 A Two-Country Monetary Model with Endoge-
nous Collateral Constraints
3.1 Model Setup
Consider a simple endowment economy with two countries: AE and EM. There are two
periods t = 0, 1, with one state 0 at time 0 and two possible states in t = 1: {U,D},
where U stands for the “Up” state while D stands for the “Down” state. Agents in both
countries consume the same consumption good C. For simplicity, we ignore issues of
stochastic inflation and fluctuating exchange rates: we normalize the price of consumption
goods in all three states 0,U, D to be 1, and we assume that the exchange rate is always
one. There is a riskless real government bond in each country, denoted by BAE and
BEM . Each unit of riskless bond pays one unit of consumption good in both U and D,
so BAE=BEM=B; thus there is only one type of riskless asset in the model. The riskless
bond is meant to represent short-term, riskless government bonds (e.g., Treasury bills, or
their EM counterparts).The payoffs (promises) of riskless real bonds will be paid by the
government that issues them from tax revenues.
There is also a risky real asset in each country, denoted by YAE and YEM . Risky
assets deliver consumption goods at t = 116, and their payoffs are given exogenously by
(dAEU , d
AE





17Assume that (dAEU , d
AE




D ), so that YAE and
YEM deliver the same payoff vector. An important assumption is that only YAE can serve
as collateral to back privately issued financial claims.18 To distinguish YAE and YEM






D so that asset payoffs are
strictly higher in the “Up” state. YAE is meant to represent assets acquired via QE (e.g.,
long-term Treasury securities, agency bonds or MBS); YEM is meant to represent the EM
counterpart (of YAE) (e.g., long-term EM government bonds). Note that this paper does
not seek to model the maturity structure of longer-term assets; instead, we focus on their
15Early work includes Kouri (1976), Tobin and de Macedo (1979), Driskill and McCafferty (1980a,b), Dornbusch and
Fischer (1980), Henderson and Rogoff (1980) (among many others).
16Inflation does not play a crucial role in this paper, so it does not matter whether risky payoffs are money or consumption
goods. Each risky asset is similar to a Lucas tree.
17These payoffs are meant to indicate the continuation values that the long term assets YAE and YEM would have at U
and at D if the model had more than two periods. Even ”riskless” long term U.S. Treasury Bonds have risky valuations in
the short run.
18We could weaken this assumption. For example, we could equally assume YEM can also serve as collateral, but has
smaller collateral capacity than YAE .
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riskiness (i.e., risk premium) relative to riskless short-term assets.
While AE and EM assets can differ in many aspects in reality, we focus here on their
distinct collateral properties, which will be the crucial properties for the international
transmission of QE in the model.
Figure 5: Payoff Vectors of YAE and YEM
There is a finite number of agents in each country, denoted by superscript h ∈ H =
1, ..., H for AE, and h∗ ∈ H∗ = 1, ..., H∗ for EM. Agents i ∈ H ∪H∗ have von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function and common beliefs about future states.
ui(c0, cU , cD) = v
i(c0) + δ
i(probU · vi(cU) + probD · vi(cD)) (1)
This paper focuses on heterogeneity that stems from agents’ distinct endowment
streams. However, heterogeneity can also arise from myriad other channels (e.g., hetero-
geneous beliefs about future states and heterogeneous risk aversions), which can generate
qualitatively similar results.
Agents in each country are endowed with the consumption good C, their respective
risky assets YAE and YEM , and riskless bond B. Agents’ endowments, in the two countries,
are summarized as follows:
AE: (ehC0 , e
h
YAE












}s∈{U,D}) ∀h∗ ∈ H∗
eC0 and {eCs}s∈{U,D} denote the endowment of consumption goods in each period and
state; eB denotes agents’ initial endowment of riskless bonds; eYAE and eYEM denote
agents’ initial endowments of risky assets.
AE and EM are distinguished from each other in three important respects. First, YAE
and YEM differ in their collateral capacities—only YAE can serve as collateral to secure
privately issued financial claims. Second, agents in each country are only endowed with
the risky asset of their own country at t = 0, and the AE assets are more valuable because
they can be used as collateral. Third, only the AE central bank is active, and its balance
sheet is indirectly owned by domestic agents only (as will be further discussed below).
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3.2 Collateral and Privately Issued Financial Claims
In the Arrow-Debreu [A-D] model (or standard models of general equilibrium with incom-
plete asset markets), it is assumed that agents can issue arbitrary quantities of (existing)
financial promises as long as they are able to deliver the promised amount in each possible
state of the world. In reality, significant shares of privately issued financial claims are
secured by some form of collateral.
Thus, we follow Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) and assume
that in our two-country economy all private borrowing (i.e., issuances of financial claims)
must be collateralized. Any privately issued financial claim at t = 0 specifies a quantity
of (i) consumption good that the borrower has to repay (independent of state s) in t = 1
in order to extinguish the debt and (ii) a quantity of collateral, i.e., YAE, that can be
seized by the lender in the event of default (i.e., non-payment of a promised amount
of consumption good)19. The financial claim gives the holder (lender) no rights to the
asset pledged as collateral, except in the event of default. In other words, the financial
claim gives the issuer (borrower) the right to discharge the claim by paying the promised
amount of consumption good, or, by giving up the collateral. The borrower chooses which
is better for him. Such financial claims are referred to as no-recourse claims.
Specifically, assume there is trading in a set of privately issued financial claims j ∈ J
at t = 0. Each unit of financial claim j promises the delivery of j units of consumption
good in both states at t = 1 (non-contingent financial claims) and is secured by one unit
of YAE as collateral. Denote qj as the price of one unit of financial claim j. A financial
claim j can therefore be written as {(j, j); one unit of YAE}, and is sold at unit price qj.
Actual delivery of financial claim j is thus equal to min(j, dAEs ), ∀s ∈ {U,D}. We shall
assume that j = dAED is among the available j ∈ J .
Given such a set of financial claims, an agent can borrow amount qj at t = 0 by
issuing (selling) a unit of financial claim j. By doing so, the agent promises to repay
(j, j) (in units of consumption goods) at t = 1 and must own one unit of YAE as collateral
to secure the financial claim. Agents can buy or sell arbitrary quantities of each financial
claim at a competitive per unit price.
3.3 Treasury Bonds, Central Bank Bonds, and Quantitative
Easing:
We assume that the AE and EM Treasuries have already issued riskless bondsB promising









B , respectively. We suppose the AE central bank can acquire risky asset
YAE by issuing riskless bonds b, also promising one unit of the consumption good. Denote
the prices of b and YAE to be q0 and πAE respectively. If the AE central bank chooses to
19In this context, the borrower issues (sells) a financial claim to the lender; the lender pays the borrower today (i.e., at
t = 0) in exchange for repayment of consumption good tomorrow (i.e., at t = 1).
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acquire yCBAE units of YAE at t = 0, it will need to issue enough bonds b
CB so that
q0 · bCB = πAE · yCBAE (2)
The bonds B issued by the Treasury and the bonds b issued by the central bank reserves
are perfect substitutes. In reality the central bank issues bank reserves, but these pay
interest and so we shall call them central bank bonds.
In this finite-horizon model, assets recorded on the AE central bank’s balance sheet
must be sold in the terminal period t = 1 (at the same time the AE central bank redeems
its outstanding liabilities). 20 However, the value of the AE central bank’s assets can
(i) differ across states of the world, (ii) exceed (or fall short of) the AE central bank’s
liabilities, and (iii) result in the AE central bank potentially accruing balance sheet
earnings (or losses). As in Araujo, Schommer, and Woodford (2015), we assume that
any such AE central bank’s balance sheet surpluses would be transferred to the Treasury,
thereby reducing the tax collection needed to retire government debt at t = 1; similarly,
balance sheet losses would be offset by higher tax collection at t = 1. The revenues
required to retire government debt (or pay off the AE central bank’s balance sheet losses)
are raised via lump-sum taxation on domestic agents. Thus, we can think of the AE
central bank as a monetary-fiscal authority. Each agent’s tax share is denoted by θh and




Given this assumption, the tax obligation T hs of agent h in state s is given by
T hs = θ
h(eAEB + b
CB − yCBAEdAEs ) (3)









s must be covered by tax revenues (generated by domestic agents).
The EM central bank does not engage in quantitative easing. Hence the tax obligation
T h
∗
s of each agent h





3.4 Agent Maximization and Equilibrium
To maximize utility, agent h decides on an optimal consumption stream, denoted




D), together with a period-0 asset portfolio(ψ
h, ϕh, µh, yhAE, y
h
EM). This
would allow for the desired consumption stream, where ψh = {ψhj }j∈J indicates the
purchase of each type of financial claim j ∈ J ; ϕh = {ϕhj }j∈J indicates the sale (issuance)
of each type of financial claim j ∈ J ; µh indicates the holdings of riskless bonds21; yhAE
and yhEM indicate the holdings of YAE and YEM . Agents are subject to (i) their budget
constraints and (ii) collateral constraints.
20At the end of the terminal period, agents consume all the consumption goods.
21i.e., riskless Treasury bond or riskless central bank bond.
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Denote q = {qj}j∈J as the price of each privately issued financial claim j ∈ J ; q0 as
the price of riskless assets; and π = {πEM , πAE} as the prices of YAE and YEM .
The AE agent maximization problem can therefore be written as follows:
AE:
Given prices π ∈ R2++, q ∈ RJ+, q0 ∈ R++, and tax obligations T h ∈ R2++, agent h





























(ψhj − ϕhj )min{j, dAEs }






where ch ≥ 0, ψh ≥ 0, ϕh ≥ 0, µh ≥ 0, yhAE ≥ 0, yhEM ≥ 0.
Equation (6) represents agent h’s period-0 budget constraint, which says that the cost
of (i) consumption ch0 and (ii) portfolio (ψ
h, ϕh, µh, yhAE, y
h
EM) cannot exceed the value of




j − ϕhj ) > 0, agent h is a net buyer of




j −ϕhj ) < 0,
agent h is a net issuer of financial claims and thus a borrower in the economy.)
Equation (7) represents agent h’s budget constraint in state s at t = 1, which says
that the cost of consumption chs cannot exceed the value of (i) consumption endowment
in state s, (ii) payoff from YAE and YEM , (iii) net delivery from financial claims, (iv)
delivery from riskless assets, and (v) net of tax obligation. As noted above, any losses or
earnings from the AE central bank’s asset purchases will be transferred to AE agents via
tax collection at t = 1. Thus, one can think of the AE central bank’s balance sheet as
indirectly owned by AE agents.
Equation (8) represents the collateral constraint, which requires agent h to hold suf-
ficient quantities of YAE (as collateral) to back its issuance of financial claims {ϕhj }j∈J .
The EM agent maximization problem can be similarly written as follows:
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EM:
Given prices π ∈ R2++, q ∈ RJ+, q0 ∈ R++, and tax obligations T h
∗ ∈ R2++, agent































































j )min{j, dAEs }
+µh











∗ ≥ 0, ψh∗ ≥ 0, ϕh∗ ≥ 0, µh∗ ≥ 0, yh∗AE ≥ 0, yh
∗
EM ≥ 0.
















}s∈{U,D}) for each h∗ ∈ H∗;
yCBAE ,
a collateral equilibrium for the economy is a vector
[(c̄, ψ̄, ϕ̄, µ̄, ȳAE, ȳEM); (c̄
∗, ψ̄∗, ϕ̄∗, µ̄∗, ȳ∗AE, ȳ
∗
EM); (π̄, q̄), T̄ , T̄
∗]
that satisfies the following:
























































































































AE; where bAE = πAE
q0
yCBAE
The equilibrium can be characterized as a system of non-linear equations representing
the agents’ first order, boundary, and market-clearing conditions. Given numerical inputs,
the system of equations can be solved numerically. (See the online appendix for the list
of characterizing equations used for computation.)
3.5 Asymmetric Collateral Properties and Private Portfolio of
International Assets
An underlying assumption in the model is that YAE (vs. YEM) is a superior form of
collateral. In reality, the superior collateral capacity of YAE can be caused by a few factors:
(i) better international credibility, or (ii) higher market liquidity or (iii) more reliable
collateral properties (supported by highly advanced accounting and legal institutions).
Indeed, one distinguishing feature of an advanced financial system is its superior ability
to produce collateral-backed financial promises. This increases the collateral value of AE
assets that can be pledged as collateral in the AE’s sophisticated financial markets.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the use of collateral in the international
financial system has become increasingly important due to (ii) more prudent risk man-
agement practices (adopted by financial institutions) and (ii) changing regulatory land-
scapes. This has partly contributed to a persistent demand for high-quality collateral
(e.g., U.S. Treasury securities). AE assets tend to be preferred by financial institutions
in need of collateralized borrowing. By contrast, EM assets generally have lower asso-
ciated collateral properties, internationally, for a myriad of reasons (e.g., relatively low
international credibility and less market liquidity as a result of underdeveloped collateral
markets).
When YAE and YEM only differ in their collateral capacities (as we assume in the
model), cross-border capital flows arise as a result of the international sharing of scarce
collateral. Given that only YAE can serve as collateral to back privately issued financial
claims, collateral-constrained agents, in both AE and EM, prefer holding YAE in order
to obtain collateralized borrowing. Such global demand for collateral will increase the
collateral value of YAE and its price. However, agents with no collateral constraints prefer
relatively cheaper YEM . The following lemmas and propositions serve to characterize these
types of cross-border asset-holding patterns.
Lemma 1 (Collateral Premium) Suppose YAE and YEM deliver the same payoff vec-
tor at t = 1 (i.e., dAEs = d
EM
s ∀s ∈ {U,D}). Despite the same payoff vector, in
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collateral equilibrium, YAE is always traded at a non-negative collateral premium over
YEM , i.e. πAE ≥ πEM . If some agent h holds yhEM > 0, and if the collateral constraint
binds strictly for h (so that eliminating the constraint from her budget set would raise her
utility), then πAE > πEM . The difference πAE − πEM reflects the collateral value of YAE.
Lemma 1 is intuitively simple to understand: since YAE and YEM are assumed to
deliver the same payoff vector, πAE can not be lower than πEM in equilibrium (or else an
arbitrage opportunity exists). However, it is possible for πAE to be greater than πEM ,
since YAE can also serve as collateral, and thus is more valuable to agents with collateral
constraints. Every agent with strictly binding collateral constraints would replace some
of her yEM with yAE unless πAE > πEM . The collateral premium (i.e., πAE−πEM) reflects
the “tightness” of the collateral constraints in the economy. 22
No-Default Theorem (Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015)) Assume there are only
two possible states s ∈ {U,D} at t = 1. Suppose that, in equilibrium, the financial claim
j∗, where j∗ = min{dAEU , dAED }, is available to be traded; in this case, j∗ will be the only
financial claim that is actively traded.23
The No-Default Theorem posits that when there are only two possible states at
t = 1, agents endogenously choose a single, no-default financial claim j∗, where j∗ =
min{dAEU , dAED }, to be actively traded in equilibrium24. Recall that a unit of financial
claim j∗ delivers payment (j∗, j∗) at t = 1, and is secured by one unit of collateral YAE.
The condition j∗ = min{dAEU , dAED } ensures that the payoff from YAE (i.e., the collateral)
always weakly exceeds the promised payment in both states at t = 1 (so that default
does not occur in equilibrium).
The No-Default Theorem simplifies our associated analysis since there is only one
actively traded financial claim j∗ to be considered (and equilibrium does not involve
actual default). However, it must be emphasized that while actual default does not
occur in equilibrium, the possibility of default (i) limits borrowing because it requires all
privately issued financial claims to be fully secured by collateral and (ii) does have real
consequences on the equilibrium price of collateral (for example, via the endogenously
determined collateral premium πAE − πEM). Since default does not occur in equilibrium,
holding a unit of financial claim j∗ delivers the same payoff as holding j∗ units of any
other riskless asset, hence qj∗ = q0d
AE
D .
Figure 6 illustrates two possible types of privately issued financial claims, j and j∗.
Each vector in the quadrant represents the payoff vector (i.e., payoff in s ∈ {U,D}) of
the corresponding asset.
−−→
OB (red) represents the payoff vector of one unit of collateral
22While many factors (e.g., credit risk, market liquidity, and underlying growth prospects) can contribute to variations
in asset prices, Lemma 1 highlights collateral properties (e.g., haircuts) as a potential candidate.
23More precisely, the theorem states that if there is an equilibrium with positive trade in some j 6= j∗, then there is also
an equilibrium with the same consumption in which only contract j∗ is positively traded.






OA′ (green arrows) represent the payoff vector of one unit of j and
j∗, respectively. Financial claim j involves a default in equilibrium because the promised
payment j exceeds the value of collateral in state D, i.e., j > dAED ; however, financial
claim j∗ (where j∗ = min{dAEU , dAED }) does not involve any default since the promised
payment does not exceed the value of collateral in both states. One observes that j∗ is the
maximum amount of promise an issuer can credibly make (against one unit of collateral)
without invoking default in equilibrium. The No-Default Theorem shows that j∗ will be
the only actively traded financial claim in equilibrium.
Figure 6 also illustrates why collateral is important. An agent who holds YAE and
wants money immediately could always sell the YAE. The reason to use YAE as collateral
in order to borrow by selling j or j∗ is that after repaying the loan, the agent is left with
money exclusively in the state U . Thus agents who are especially desirous of money in
U , either because they attach relatively high probability to the state or because they are
relatively poor there, will be the ones who prefer to buy YAE (via borrowing) rather than
YEM , which delivers dividends in both states.
Figure 6: Default vs. No-Default Financial Claims
Lemma 2 (Maximum Leverage) Suppose YAE and YEM deliver the same payoff vec-
tor at t = 1, i.e., dAEs = d
EM
s ∀s ∈ {U,D}. If πAE > πEM , then in equilibrium any
private portfolio necessarily satisfies: yAE = ϕj∗.
When collateral constraints bind in equilibrium, demand for collateral gives rise to the
strictly positive collateral premium (i.e., πAE > πEM), as in Lemma 1. Lemma 2 says that
given a cheaper alternative YEM , any holdings of YAE are necessarily collateralized (i.e.,
leveraged) to the maximum, otherwise the agent would replace some yAE with cheaper
yEM .
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While Lemma 2 depends upon the simplifying assumption that YAE and YEM only
differ in terms of collateral properties, it does provide some practical insights: the lemma
suggests that the existence of higher-return alternatives for AE assets (e.g., EM assets
with high credit ratings) creates a compelling incentive for private agents who hold AE
assets to make extensive use of the collateral properties (e.g., low haircuts) of AE as-
sets (e.g., through leverage, maturity transformation, or other types of collateralization
activities).
Lemma 3 (International Portfolio Choice) Suppose YAE and YEM deliver the same
payoff vector at t = 1, i.e., dAEs = d
EM
s ∀s ∈ {U,D}, and suppose πAE−πEM > 0. Then
there are three different types of portfolios held by agents in equilibrium:
• Type 1 (fully leveraged portfolio): yAE = ϕj∗ > 0, yEM = 0, and ψj∗ = µ = 0.
• Type 2 (partially leveraged portfolio): yAE = ϕj∗ > 0, yEM > 0, and ψj∗ =
µ = 0.
• Type 3 (unleveraged portfolio): yAE = ϕj∗ = 0, yEM ≥ 0, and ψj∗ + µ ≥ 0.
Intuitively, the Type 1 portfolio consists exclusively of fully leveraged (i.e., collater-
alized) YAE; in other words, the entire portfolio is leveraged. (Note that the condition
yAE = ϕj∗ > 0 indicates binding collateral constraints, so that the entire holding of YAE
is pledged as collateral for the issuance of financial claims.) The Type 2 portfolio is a
combination of fully leveraged YAE, together with a positive amount of YEM ; this type
of portfolio is considered partially leveraged. The Type 3 portfolio is a combination of
YEM and riskless assets, which does not involve any leverage. Lemma 3 characterizes all
possible types of portfolios that private agents will actually hold in an equilibrium when
πAE > πEM .
Figure 7 illustrates the payoff vectors associated with these three types of portfolios.
The grey (shaded) region represents the feasible set of portfolio payoffs that agents can
attain with the available assets (i.e., YAE, YEM and riskless assets). Ray
−−→
OB (red)
represents the payoff vector of holding a positive quantity of risky assets (i.e., YAE and
YEM). Ray
−→
OA (green) represents the payoff vectors that can be attained by holding
different amounts of riskless assets. (Note that ray
−→
OA is clockwise relative to ray
−−→
OB
under the assumption that the payoff of risky assets (i.e., YAE and YEM) is strictly higher
in state U (vs. state D).) Vector
−−→
BC indicates the payoff vector associated with issuing
financial claims (i.e., debt). (Note that
−−→
BC is parallel to
−→
OA, since both represent changes
in the amounts of riskless assets being held.) Ray
−→
OC (blue) represents the payoff vector of
fully leveraged YAE; it is achieved by (i) holding YAE (
−−→
OB) and (ii) simultaneously issuing
debt (
−−→
BC). Note that point C is on the leftward boundary of the attainable region (grey)
because
−−→
BC represents the maximum amount of riskless debt that any private agent can
issue against the holding of
−−→
OB (i.e., the collateral). (Vector
−→
OC delivers zero payoff in
19
state D, indicating that the amount of collateral is just enough to allow the debt to be
repaid in state D, so that default does not occur.)







these three rays are linearly dependent, implying that each point within the shaded region
can be achieved via non-unique combinations of individual assets. Nevertheless, Lemma
3 suggests that under binding collateral constraints, each point in the attainable region
is achieved via a unique combination of individual assets. The three types of portfolios
correspond to the three regions shown in Figure 7. Denote (wU , wD) as the coordinates
of portfolio payoffs, we can define the three regions (in Figure 7) formally as the follows:
• Region 1 (fully leveraged portfolio): wD = 0 and wU > 0 (i.e., ray
−→
OC).






















Payoffs in Region 1, 2 and 3 are attained by Type 1, 2 and 3 portfolios, respectively.





when there is a positive collateral value. Such a portfolio can be improved by reducing
borrowing by one unit of j∗ and reducing YAE by one unit (that is by reducing
−→
OC by
one unit) and increasing YEM by one unit (that is by extending
−−→
OB by one unit) and
decreasing µ by j∗ units (that is by reducing
−→
OA by j∗ units). This improvement gives
the same terminal payoffs (wU , wD) while saving the collateral value cost πAE − πEM .
Figure 7: Payoffs of Type 1, 2 and 3 Portfolios
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3.6 Effects of the AE Central Bank’s Open-Market Purchases
of Risky Assets (QE)
There are two primary channels that enable the AE central bank to generate real impacts
in the model. The first channel is based on the fiscal consequences of the AE central
bank’s asset purchases. Since any earnings or losses from the AE central bank’s balance
sheet are ultimately transferred to domestic agents via taxation, one can think of the AE
central bank’s balance sheet as indirectly owned by AE agents.
The second channel is based on the AE central bank’s ability to acquire YAE by
borrowing without collateral constraints (i.e. with 100% LTV), because the central bank
(unlike private agents) can credibly commit to repay (via tax collection) even if its promise
exceeds collateral.
Figure 8: Portfolio Shift by QE
Figure 8 illustrates the effects of the AE central bank’s purchase of YAE (which is
entirely financed by issuing central bank reserves). As above,
−−→
OB (red) represents the
payoff vector of YAE, while
−−→
BO′ (green) represents the payoff vector of issuing central
bank reserves. Thus,
−−→
OO′ (black) represents the effective payoff of the AE central bank’s
(i) purchase of YAE and (ii) simultaneous issuance of reserves. As previously noted, the
AE central bank’s balance sheet is indirectly owned by domestic agents; as a result,
−−→
OO′ will be indirectly forced upon the balance sheets of AE agents (based on their tax
shares). (
−−→
OO′ points counter-clockwise relative to
−→
OC because the AE central bank can





BC|).) Note that the payoff of
−−→
OO′ in state D can be negative because the AE
central bank is able to raise taxes in state D to pay for such losses.
Importantly, one can alternatively think of
−−→





AE central bank (i) purchases fully collateralized YAE (i.e., abiding by the same collateral
requirement as the private agents), and (ii) issues additional debt (i.e., beyond the level
of (private) collateralzied debt) to finance the entire purchase.
AE agents optimally adjust their portfolios in response to QE (i.e., when
−−→
OO′ is forced
upon their balance sheets). Below, we illustrate three different situations in which AE
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agents choose to (i) partially undo, (ii) overly undo or (iii) partially accommodate the
AE central bank’s asset purchases via QE.
Situation 1: Fully Leveraged AE Agents Partially Undo the AE Central
Bank’s Purchase of YAE
Figure 9: AE Agents Partially Undo the AE Central Bank’s Purchase of YAE
Figure 9 illustrates the situation in which a (given) fully leveraged agent h adjusts its
(Type 1) portfolio in response to QE. The indifference curves of (the indirect utility of)
agent h are shown as ellipses in the figure. It is important to note that these indifference
curves assume fixed prices and balanced budget (i.e., wealth is fully spent on consumption
at time 0 and asset purchases). A move from point C to point G represents higher
consumption in state U , the same consumption in state D, and (by balanced budget)
lower consumption in state 0. Here,
−−→
OO′ represents agent h’s share (i.e., based on its
tax share) of the AE central bank’s balance sheet. When forced upon agent h’s balance
sheet,
−−→
OO′ shifts the entire attainable set (of agent h) to the upper left.
In the case shown here, suppose that point C represents the portfolio payoff that
gives agent h the highest possible (indirect) utility prior to the shift by
−−→
OO′. (Note that
point C is not an unconstrained optimum; instead, it represents the highest indifference
curve that agent h can attain before the shift (in Figure 7).)
−−→
OO′ moves agent h from
point C to point C ′. As previously noted, one can think of the move from point C to
point C ′ as a result of (i) the AE central bank buying fully leveraged YAE (
−→
CG) and (ii)
issuing additional reserves (
−−→
GC ′) to fully finance its purchase. With the shift created by
−−→
OO′, point H becomes the new constrained-optimum for agent h. Assuming fixed prices,
agent h will adjust its portfolio by
−−→
C ′H in order to attain point H. The net trade
−−→
C ′H
represents the hedging demand created by the AE central bank’s asset purchases. Lemma
3 (below) shows that fully leveraged agent h will only partially undo the AE central bank’s
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purchase of YAE on its behalf (i.e., |
−−→
C ′H| < |
−→
CG|). In this particular situation, the AE
central bank’s purchases, together with the fully leveraged agent’s responses, create an
excess demand for YAE, thereby causing an upward pressure on πAE in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Agents Partially Undo QE) Assume fixed prices; if a given AE
agent h’s optimal portfolio is fully leveraged (Type 1), then one unit purchase of YAE by
the AE central bank (on behalf of agent h) will lead to less than one unit sale of YAE by
agent h (assuming that agent h’s optimal portfolio remains fully leveraged after the AE
central bank’s purchases).












is the implicit price of consumption in state U (obtained as the ratio of the net payoff
to the downpayment of the fully leveraged purchase of Y AE). Similarly, define agent h’s





At point C (prior to the shift by
−−→
OO′), agent h is unconstrained in state U ; this implies
that its marginal utility of income in state U is equal to that at t = 0 (i.e., MUIhU =
MUIh0 ). Since Quantitative Easing (QE) trades are budget balanced, at fixed prices,−−→
OO′ moves agent h’s portfolio payoff from point C to C ′, resulting in an increase in agent
h’s consumption in state U but no change in consumption at time 0. This results in
a decline in MUIhU relative to MUI
h
0 ; thus, agent h will optimally choose to (i) reduce
its portfolio payoff in state U and (ii) simultaneously increase its period-0 income (in
order to ensure the optimal condition MUIhU = MUI
h
0 ). By Lemma 3, agent h achieves
such adjustment via selling fully leveraged YAE (i.e.,
−−→
C ′H), which lowers chU and raises
ch0 . The new constrained-optimum H cannot be vertically as low as point C, since MUI
h
U
= MUIh0 at point C. If point H were vertically as low or lower as C, then by budget
balance consumption ch0 at H would be higher than at C, which would result in MUI
h
U
> MUIh0 , which cannot be optimal for agent h. Thus, it follows that |
−−→
C ′H| < |
−→
GC|. 
Intuitively speaking, the central bank is doing for agent h what he would like to do,
namely purchase Y AE at 100% LTV; thus, agent h will only partially undo the YAE that
is forced upon its balance sheet via QE.
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Situation 2: Partially Leveraged AE Agents Overly Undo the AE Central
Bank’s Purchase of YAE, Selling More YAE than the Central Bank Buys
Figure 10: Agents Overly Undo the Central Bank’s Purchase of YAE
Figure 10 illustrates an alternative case in which a given agent h chooses to “overly
undo” the AE central bank’s purchase of YAE (on behalf of agent h). In the case shown
here, assume that point E represents the portfolio payoff that gives agent h the highest
possible (indirect) utility prior to the shift by
−−→
OO′. (Note that point E (i) represents
the payoff of a partially leveraged (i.e., Type 2) portfolio and (ii) is the unconstrained
optimum of agent h, since it is strictly in the interior of the feasible set.)
−−→
OO′ shifts the
entire feasible set to the upper left; in particular, it moves agent h from point E to point
E ′. To best visualize how agent h undoes the AE central bank’s purchase of YAE, one





Assume both prices and the wealth of agent h are fixed. Agent h can adjust its
portfolio by
−−→
E ′E in order to return back to point E, thus fully hedging against the AE
central bank’s purchase of YAE, if he (i) sells some fully leveraged YAE, moving from E
′
to K, and (ii) buys some YEM , moving from K to E. In this particular situation, agent
h overly undoes the AE central bank’s purchase of YAE (i.e., by selling more YAE than
the the AE central bank buys on behalf of agent h). This adjustment leaves agent h with
extra wealth, which he will spend on increasing c0, cU , and cD. In the end he will still
overly undo the central bank purchase of YAE. This creates a downward pressure on πAE
in equilibrium.
In order to prove why this should be so, we recall the definition of loan to value (LTV)












= 1 + α > 1
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Proposition 2 (Agents Overly Undo QE) Assume fixed prices; if a given agent h’s
optimal portfolio is partially leveraged (Type 2), then one unit purchase of YAE by the AE
central bank (on behalf of agent h) will lead to more than one unit sale of YAE by agent
h and to a purchase of YEM (assuming that agent h’s optimal portfolio remains partially
leveraged after the AE central bank’s purchases).
Proof:
Step 1: If agent h returns to point E after the QE shift, then h must be
selling CV = 1 + α > 1 units of YAE.
The central bank is buying 1 unit of YAE and selling the same value of bonds, namely
πAE
q0
bonds. Let agent h buy back πAE
q0
bonds from those he himself already issued. That
frees him to sell CV = 1+α > 1 units of YAE, since he no longer needs them as collateral
for the bonds he no longer issues. Finally, let h buy α units of YEM . Agent h has thus
in total sold 1 unit of risky assets, and purchased πAE
q0
bonds, precisely undoing what the
central bank did, and returning him to point E. But notice that because the central bank
operation broke even, agent h has actually saved α(πAE − πEM) > 0 dollars by replacing
α units of YAE with α units of YEM .
Step 2: Taking into account the wealth effects of portfolio adjustment, h
must be selling more than one units of YAE.
We must check now that after returning to point E with extra money α(πAE−πEM) >
0 , agent h will not want to buy back at least α units of YAE. Because agent h has addi-
tively separable utility, at the fixed prices, he will spend the extra wealth in a way that will
increase consumption beyond the levels at point E in all three states. By Lemma 3, if the
agent remains partially leveraged in region 2, then agent h will spend a positive amount
on ch0 and a positive amount on YEM . It follows that agent h will spend strictly less than
α(πAE − πEM) on fully leveraged purchases of YAE. But each such purchase requries a
downpayment of πAE−q0dAED > πAE−πEM . (The last inequality holds because YEM pays
exactly the same as dEMD = d
AE
D bonds in the down state, and strictly more in the up
state, and hence must have greater value, πEM > q0d
AE
D .) Hence agent h will buy strictly
less than α units of YAE with his extra wealth of α(πAE − πEM). Combing steps 1 and
2 leaves agent h selling more than one unit of YAE for every unit the central bank buys. 
Proposition 2 is a surprising result, as it shows the possibility of QE causing a down-
ward pressure on AE asset prices, and upward pressure on EM asset prices. The intuition
is as follows. Partially leveraged agents hold a portfolio that reflects a balance between
the advantages of being able to leverage, by holding YAE, and getting higher return, by
holding YEM . The central bank forces on them more 100% leveraged YAE, or equivalently,
more leveraged (at private margins) YAE plus some borrowing. Partially leveraged agents
can simply undo the new YAE purchases at private margins by unwinding the exact same
number from their own portfolios. The additional borrowing forced upon them tips the
balance by reducing the need for YAE in order to borrow. Therefore they sell even more
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YAE and substitute higher yielding YEM .
Situation 3: Unleveraged AE Agents Partially Accommodate QE by Sell-
ing EM Assets and Absorbing the Increased Supply of Central Bank Reserves
Figure 11: AE Agents Sell EM assets and Absorb Central Bank Reserves
Figure 11 illustrates the situation in which a given unleveraged agent h adjusts its
(Type 3) portfolio in response to the AE central bank’s purchase of YAE. In the case
shown here, suppose that point D represents the portfolio payoff that gives agent h the




OO′ moves agent h’s portfolio payoff
from point D to D′. As illustrated in Figure 8, the shift
−−→





LD′. Assuming prices are fixed, agent h can return back to
point D via a combination of (i) selling one unit of YEM and (ii) buying a commensurate
amount of riskless assets. But this will leave him with a budget shortfall. Proposition 3
shows that the upshot is that agent h sells more than one unit of YEM . In this particular
situation, the AE central bank’s asset purchases create (i) an excess demand for YAE
(under fixed prices) and (ii) an excess supply of YEM and thus an upward pressure on
πAE − πEM and r in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Agents Partially Accommodate QE) Assume fixed prices and as-








, γh < 1. If a given agent h’s optimal portfolio is unleveraged (Type 3) and and he
holds strictly positive amounts of YEM , then for every unit of YAE that the AE central
bank buys (by issuing πAE
q0
units of riskless assets) on behalf of agent h, agent h will con-








At unchanged prices, the agent can get back to the same porfolio payoffs by pur-
chasing πAE
q0
units of riskless assets and selling one unit of Y EM . Since the central bank
intervention broke even, that portfolio adjustment will leave agent h with a wealth loss
of πAE − πEM . By homotheticity, he will deal with that by reducing all his holdings of
c0, Y
EM , B proportionately. Hence he will end up selling more than one unit of YEM and
buying less than πAE
q0
units of riskless assets. 
Intuitively, unleveraged agent h is marginally indifferent between risky YEM and risk-
less assets (at its optimum) prior to QE; thus, for every unit of risky YAE that the AE
central bank forces upon agent h’s portfolio (via QE), agent h will optimally choose to
sell some risky YEM , while buying some riskless assets. In this regard, unleveraged agents
are the “natural” absorbers of the increased supply of central bank reserves. However, as
the proof shows, agent h does not fully absorb the AE central bank’s issuance of central
bank reserves; thus, ceteris paribus, QE creates an excess supply of riskless assets and a
simultaneous upward pressure on the real interest rate in equilibrium.
4 A Two-Country Monetary Model with Endoge-
nous Collateral Constraints: Numerical Analysis
We illustrate the workings of the two-country collateral-equilibrium monetary model via
a simple numerical example. The example displays the collateral channel for international
capital flows and the heterogeneous responses of heterogeneous agents that is reminiscent
of the financial and nonfinancial firms in the data. It also displays the reversal in the
effects of QE as agents who were exclusively leveraged holders of AE assets eventually
respond to the QE-induced yield advantage of EM assets over AE assets by diversifying
into EM assets. A substantial number of AE agents begin with Type 1 portfolios, and as
QE expands they shift into Type 2 portfolios, and then eventually Type 3 portfolios.
Section 4 is organized as the follows: Section 4.1 describes numerical specifications.
Section 4.2 illustrates how capital flows arise as a result of the asymmetric collateral
properties between YAE and YEM ; this is attained by comparing the Autarky equilibrium
with the Free-Trade equilibrium. Finally, Section 4.3 examines the effects of QE on cross-
border asset prices and asset-holding patterns. We show that under certain conditions,
the four stylized facts (described earlier) can emerge naturally in the collateral equilibrium
of the model.
4.1 Numerical Specifications
As above, there are three states 0, U, and D. Assume there are two types of agents
in each country: h = 1, 2 in AE and h∗ = 3, 4 in EM. All agents have a simple homothetic
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utility function and common beliefs about future states:







Agent endowments are given as the following:
AE:






, e1cD) = (3.5, 0, 0.0005, 0, 3)






, e2cD) = (3.5, 7, 0.0005, 15, 3)
EM:






, e3cD) = (3.5, 0, 0.0005, 0, 3)






, e4cD) = (3.5, 7, 0.0005, 15, 3)
Payoff vectors of YAE and YEM are given by: {dAEU , dAED } = {dEMU , dEMD } = {15/7, 6/7}.
Tax shares of agents are: (θ1, θ2) = (0.9, 0.1) and (θ3, θ4) = (0.9, 0.1).25





which represents the share of YAE acquired by AE central bank via QE. Our focus is on
how variations in ω affect equilibrium asset prices and asset-holding patterns.
Monetary specifications is therefore given by ω (variable for simulation)).
Under the aforementioned numerical specifications, heterogeneity among agents stems
from their distinct endowment streams. However, as previously noted, heterogeneity can
also arise from a myriad of other channels (e.g., heterogeneous beliefs about future states
and heterogeneous risk aversions), which can generate qualitatively similar results.
In this particular example, both agent 1 (in the AE) and agent 3 (in the EM) are
collateral-constrained and thus natural buyers of YAE for two main reasons. First, agent
1 and 3 have asymmetric endowments across the two states at t = 1 (i.e., they are much
poorer in state U vs. state D). Risky assets deliver more in state U (vs. D), thus
providing a good hedge against the endowment risk of agent 1 and 3. Second, agent 1
and 3 have no initial endowment of risky assets and thus want to purchase as many risky
assets as possible via issuances of financial claims. Since only YAE can serve as collateral
(to secure the issuance of financial claims), agent 1 and 3 strictly prefer purchasing YAE
with collateralized borrowing than purchasing YEM with cash, so long as πAE is not too
much higher than πEM . Agent 2 and 4, on the other hand, are unconstrained (since they
are endowed with abundant risky assets).
25As in Araujo, Schommer and Woodford, asymmetric tax shares are meant to (i) amplify the effects of QE and (ii)
facilitate the illustration of simulation results.
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Figure 12: Graphical Illustration of Agent Endowments.
Figure 13: Graphical Illustration of Risky Asset Payoffs.
Note that EM endowments are symmetric to those in the AE (with agent 3 mirroring
agent 1 and agent 4 mirroring agent 2); however, agent 2 and 4 are endowed with risky
assets that have different collateral capacities.
4.2 Financial Integration and Capital Flows: ω = 0
Prior to analyzing the financial spillover effects of QE, it is helpful to illustrate the
underlying driving forces behind the capital flows in the model. We do so by comparing
equilibrium outcomes (i.e., Autarky vs. Free Trade).
Table 3 shows the asset-holding patterns when AE and EM are not allowed to trade
their assets. While both agent 1 and 3 are the natural buyers of risky assets, agent 1
(vs. agent 3) can afford to buy many more risky assets because only YAE can serve as
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collateral (to secure a financial claim). Agent 3 can only purchase a small amount of YEM
(in the absence of collateralized borrowing).
Table 3: Asset Holdings under Autarky
YAE YEM
Agent 1 3.89 -
Agent 2 3.11 -
Agent 3 - 1.23
Agent 4 - 5.77
Table 4 shows the asset-holding patterns when the AE and EM are open for trade.
Under Free Trade, both agent 1 and 3 can purchase YAE with collateralized borrowing;
thus, each holds half of the total supply of YAE. Unconstrained agent 2 and 4, on the
other hand, split the supply of cheaper YEM . (Note that agent 2 is initially endowed
with the more expensive YAE and thus has greater initial wealth than agent 4; this allows
agent 2 to acquire a greater amount of YEM in equilibrium.)
Table 4: Asset Holdings under Free Trade
YAE YEM
Agent 1 3.5 0
Agent 2 0 3.58
Agent 3 3.5 0
Agent 4 0 3.42
Table 5 compares risky asset prices relative to bond prices under Autarky and Free
Trade. Under Autarky, YAE is more expensive than YEM relative to their respective bond
prices, because YAE can serve as collateral—resulting in additional collateral value
26; with
free trade, EM demand for collateral increases πAE/q
AE
0 further, while simultaneously
making YEM more attractive to unconstrained agents. Surprisingly, free trade raises
πEM/q
EM




4.3 Effects of QE on Cross-Border Asset Prices and Asset Hold-
ings: ω > 0
The aforementioned numerical exercises illustrate equilibrium outcomes in the ab-
sence of QE intervention (i.e., ω = 0). We now consider the effects of the AE central
26We focus on the risky asset prices relative to bond prices because the ratio captures the cost of borrowing in different
scenarios. Under Autarky, the riskless interest rates in the two economies are different; qAE0 < q
EM
0 because YAE can serve
as collateral to support the issuance of private financial promises, resulting in greater supply of bonds in AE.
27This is similar to the computational results in Fostel, Geanakoplos and Phelan (2017).
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bank’s purchase of YAE with ω > 0. The simulation results provide a way to jointly
interpret the qualitative patterns of the empirical facts described earlier.
Interpreting Empirical Facts in the Model:
The model simulation in Figure 14 illustrates how free trade risky asset prices πAE
and πEM respond to QE as ω increases linearly from 0 to 1. In Figure 14, as ω increases
from point A to B, πAE also increases. However, further increase in ω (beyond point B)
results in a decline in πAE. This is qualitatively consistent with Fact 1(a) and 1(b). In
this scenario, the Federal Reserve’s early purchase of long-term Treasury securities was
accompanied by a decline in the long-term Treasury yield; however, ongoing purchases
were conversely accompanied by an rise in the long-term Treasury yield. Below, we
further clarify the mechanism that enables this pattern to arise in the model.
(a) (b)
Figure 14: Effects of QE on Risky Asset Prices
Rationalization of Fact 1(a): increase in πAE from point A to B
As ω increases from point A to B, the AE central bank effectively buys YAE on behalf
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of AE agents 1 and 2, leveraging28 more than any private agents could because the AE
central bank can commit to repay (even if its debt exceeds the collateral). This increases
the demand for YAE and its price because at this stage, agent 1 is fully leveraged (with
a Type 1 portfolio), and thus only partially undoes the YAE that the AE central bank
forces upon its portfolio; this is shown by Situation 1 and Proposition 1. Overall, the AE
central bank’s purchases create an excess demand for YAE, thereby causing an upward
pressure on πAE in equilibrium. This gives rise to the increase in πAE from point A to B.
Meanwhile, agent 2 is unleveraged (with a Type 3 portfolio), and partially accommodates
the AE central bank’s purchase of YAE (on behalf of agent 2) by (i) selling its holdings
of YEM and (ii) absorbing the increased supply of central bank reserves (as shown in
Situation 3 and Proposition 3). This results in a decline in πEM from point A to point
B.
(a) AE: Agent 1 (b) AE: Agent 2
Figure 15: QE and Effects on the Asset Holdings of AE Agents
Rationalization of Fact 1(b): decrease in πAE from point B to C
Fact 1(b) shows that the Federal Reserve’s continued purchases of long-term Treasury
securities (since July 2012) were accompanied by an increase in the long-term Treasury
yield and its risk premium. The model suggests that one potential contributing factor
(to the observed increase) in long-term Treasury yield and its risk premium could have
been AE agents’ portfolio shifts of international assets (in response to QE).
In the simulation, following a sufficiently large purchase of YAE (beyond point B) by
the AE central bank, agent 1 switches from a fully leveraged (Type 1) portfolio into a
partially leveraged (Type 2) portfolio. (This can be visualized in Figure 9: sufficiently
28As previously noted, the AE central bank’s purchase of YAE , financed entirely by issuing reserves, is a form of leveraged




OO′ can relocate the optimum of agent h from one region to another.) This
puts agent 1 into Situation 2 (beyond point B); thus, agent 1 optimally chooses to overly
undo the AE central bank’s purchases by (i) selling more YAE than the AE central bank
buys and (ii) buying cheaper YEM (i.e., by Proposition 2). Meanwhile, agent 2 continues
to accommodate QE by (i) selling EM assets and (ii) absorbing some of the increased
supply of central bank reserves. Overall, AE agents sell YAE sufficiently fast that it causes
a decline in πAE from point B to C.
Reinterpreting Treasury Yield Changes as a Result of Varying Risk Premium:
Variations in the Risk Premium of YAE
One way that QE affects long-term interest rates is via direct impacts on the term
(risk) premium29. Figure 1 suggests that changes in the 10-year Treasury yield (from
November 2010 to November 2014) have been partly driven by variations in the term
(risk) premium. The Federal Reserve’s early purchases of long-term Treasury securities
corresponded with a decline in the term premium of 10-year Treasury; however, subse-
quent purchases were conversely accompanied by a slight increase in the term premium.
In our model, one can similarly interpret the impacts of QE on πAE as transmitted
via its effects on the risk premium of YAE. Below, we compute the risk premium of YAE
and show its non-monotonic response to QE in the model.
Define the expected real rate of return on riskless bond as:







Similarly, define the expected real rate of return on YAE as:









The risk premium of YAE can thus be defined as r
AE−r. Figure 16 shows QE’s effects on
the risk premium of YAE. QE lowers the risk premium of YAE (from point A to B) because
AE agents only partially undo the AE central bank’s purchase of YAE; this enables the
AE central bank to (i) create an excess demand for YAE (under fixed prices) and (ii) push
down the risk premium of YAE in equilibrium. However, continued QE (beyond point B)
induces portfolio shifts towards cheaper YEM (that will more than offset the AE central
bank’s purchase of YAE); this results in an increase in the risk premium of YAE.
29See, for example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) for a discussion on the risk premium channel of QE’s
transmission.
33
Figure 16: Effects of QE on the Risk Premium of YAE
Rationalization of Fact 2: variation in πAE − πEM from point A to C;
Fact 2 shows (i) a widening yield spread between the United States and EMs during the
Federal Reserve’s early purchases of long-term Treasury securities and (ii) a subsequent
tightening of the spread in response to continued asset purchases. The model suggests
that the private sector’s portfolio shifts could have contributed to such financial spillover
patterns.
As previously noted, the AE central bank’s early purchase creates an excess demand
for YAE (from point A to B) and raises πAE relative to πEM in equilibrium (i.e., widening
the spread between AE and EM asset prices). However, continued QE (beyond point B)
induces AE agents to (i) sell YAE faster than the AE central bank buys and (ii) increase
the net purchase of YEM . This type of portfolio adjustment increases the relative demand
for YEM (vs. YAE) and thus tightens the spread.
Rationalization of Fact 3: heterogeneous variation in y1EM and y
2
EM
Fact 3 shows that U.S. financial and non-financial organizations had opposite re-
sponses to QE in their holdings of long-term foreign government bonds. Financial firms
increased their purchases of foreign assets, while non-financial firms sold foreign assets.
The model interprets such heterogeneous asset-holding patterns as driven by the distinct
financial situations faced by U.S. entities (e.g., whether they are leveraged or unlever-
aged).
In this context, one can simplistically think of leverage-constrained agent 1 as repre-
senting U.S. financial organizations and agent 2 as representing U.S. non-financial orga-
nizations. In the simulation, agent 1 starts off (at ω = 0) with a large share of YAE due
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to demand for leverage. As seen in Figure 15, sufficiently large QE induces agent 1 to (i)
quickly sell off leveraged YAE and (ii) buy significant amounts of YEM . (This mechanism
is analytically shown by Proposition 2.) By contrast, agent 2 starts off (at ω = 0) with a
significant share of YEM , but responds to QE by (i) selling YEM and (ii) absorbing part
of the increased supply of central bank reserves. Such model-based portfolio responses
(of agent 1 and 2) are qualitatively consistent with Fact 3.
(a) EM: Agent 3 (b) EM: Agent 4
Figure 17: Effects of QE on Asset Holdings in EM
Rationalization of Fact 4: stable y3AE from point A to C
Fact 4 shows that throughout the QE episodes, foreign demand for U.S. Treasury
securities have remained relatively stable. Our model rationalizes such persistent demand
as driven by the continued EM demand for collateral in response to QE.
Recall that the AE central bank’s balance sheet is indirectly owned by domestic
agents; thus, the direct impacts of the AE central bank’s asset purchases are upon AE
agents. In the model, expectations about the fiscal consequences of QE induce AE agents
to adjust their portfolios quite radically. By contrast, EM agents do not bear such fiscal
consequences; as a result, collateral-constrained agent 3, in the EM, continues to have a
strong demand for YAE. Figure 17(a) shows that y
3
AE declines initially from point A to
B due to a rise in πAE; however y
3
AE (i) increases again (from point B to C) as soon as
πAE declines and (ii) stays relatively stable from point A to C.
Beyond Point C: Hypothetical Scenarios
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At point C, the AE central bank has acquired so much YAE (more than 50% of total
YAE) that agent 1 in AE has completely sold off its holdings of YAE (the shift by
−−→
OO′ is
sufficiently large that agent 1’s optimum is located in Region 3’). Beyond point C, the
AE central bank competes directly with agent 3 (in the EM) for YAE, resulting in (i) a
monotonic decline in y3AE (due to shrinking supply of YAE) and (ii) a large increase in
πAE relative to πEM (i.e., a sharp decline in the risk premium of YAE). At point D, the
gap between πAE and πEM is so large that even agent 3 is induced to hold YEM beyond
this point.
This implies that despite the possible decline in πAE (e.g., from point B to C), suf-
ficiently aggressive QE does eventually cause a rise in πAE again. However, as the next
section shows, too large of a QE can have dramatic consequences on (i) the welfare of
private agents and (ii) the redistribution of wealth.
5 Welfare Consequences of QE
The above analysis highlights the heterogeneous responses of the private agents to
QE, conditional on the particular type of portfolio they hold. Figure 18 tracks QE’s wel-
fare impacts in the model, which similarly shows significant heterogeneity across agents.
As shown in Figure 18(a), both agent 1 and 3 experience a decline in welfare from
point A to B. Over this segment, both agents face binding collateral constraints and are
unambiguously hurt by the rise in the price of collateral πAE. However, the welfare of
agent 1 (vs. agent 3) decreases to a lesser extent (despite the increase in πAE) because a
portion of the AE central bank’s acquisition of YAE is indirectly owned by agent 1, which
alleviates agent 1’s collateral constraints. Overall there is net decline in the welfare of
agent 1 due to the dominating price effect.30 The welfare of agents 1 and 3 increases from
point B to C as πAE decreases over this segment.
Agent 2 (in the AE) enjoys a sharp increase in welfare from point A to B due to the
rise in πAE that results in a simultaneous increase in agent 2’s wealth (via the value of
initial endowments). However, the welfare of (i) agent 2 decreases from point B to C as
a result of the decline in πAE and (ii) agent 4 remains almost unchanged in response to
QE.
Moderately aggressive QE (halfway between B and C) raises the welfare of both
agents 1 and 2 in AE at the expense of agents in EM (compared to no QE: ω = 0).
This improvement of AE’s welfare via its central bank intervention is not general; it only
occurs over a limited range of interventions ω.
30This resembles the recent study by Rappoport (2016) that shows how mortgage subsides can possibly lower the welfare
of borrowers: while debt subsidies ease borrowers’ access to home loans, the associated increase in house price can counteract
the beneficial effects of the subsidies.
36
(a) Agent 1 and 3 (b) Agent 2 and 4
Figure 18: Effects of QE on Welfare
Sufficiently aggressive QE (beyond point C) results in dramatic changes in the welfare
of private agents. Agent 1 experiences a drastic decline in welfare because of (i) the large
amounts of YAE that is forced upon its balance sheet via QE and (ii) short-selling of YAE
is not allowed. Agent 2, on the other hand, experiences a sharp increase in welfare via
the wealth channel; the rise in πAE increases the value of agent 2’s initial endowments
substantially.
An implication of the aforementioned welfare analysis is that QE is likely to generate
heterogeneous welfare effects and result in a redistribution of wealth. For instance, to
the extent that QE does raise AE asset prices, QE may benefit owners of AE assets by
increasing the value of their initial assets. However, higher AE asset prices as a result of
QE may lower the welfare of investors who (i) demand AE assets as collateral for leverage
or (ii) face financial constraints (e.g., short-selling constraints) to hedge against the AE
central bank’s purchases.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a framework to study potential channels for the international trans-
mission of QE, with a particular emphasis on collateral and heterogeneity. The framework
differs from conventional open macroeconomic models in several important aspects. First,
all privately issued financial claims (i.e., private borrowing) must be secured by collat-
eral and the collateral requirement is determined endogenously in equilibrium. Second,
economies in the two-country setup (i.e., the AE and EM) differ in the collateral prop-
erty of their assets; furthermore, capital flows arise as a result of international sharing
of scarce collateral. Third, monetary policy consists of two dimensions: (i) conventional
interest-rate policy and (ii) unconventional variation in the size and composition of the
central bank’s balance sheet. We consider the consequences of the AE central bank’s pur-
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chases of an asset that is utilized internationally as collateral to secure privately issued
financial claims.
The model shows that it is indeed possible for the AE central bank’s asset purchases
(via QE) to increase AE asset prices in equilibrium; however, ever-larger QE can possibly
result in a decline in AE asset prices due to dramatic portfolio shifts of international
assets. Crucially, the model suggests that even within an AE, agents respond differently
to QE due the the different kinds of financial situations that they face. While some
AE agents choose to hedge against QE by replacing AE assets with EM counterparts,
others voluntarily choose to absorb the increased supply of central bank reserves. The
net effects of such portfolio adjustment matter significantly for the effectiveness of QE on
asset prices. Overall, the study highlights the importance of understanding how private
agents—both domestic and international—interact with central-bank interventions to
generate equilibrium market outcomes.
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